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discriminatory in its employment policies, that the University's provision of placement services to the
military was a provision of "services and benefits" by a state agency under the Executive Order, and that
neither state nor federal law required an exception be made for a discriminatory military recruiter. The
Commissioner's reversal of this determination, the grounds for the petition, encompassed only the last
portion of the finding.
The Respondent argued that state law required an exception to be made for a discriminatory
military recruiter. The Commissioner asserted that under section 2-a of the Education Law the military
must be permitted access to the University. The law provided that if an officer of any institution
belonging to the University of the State of New York permits access to school property to persons who
inform students about career opportunities, then such official should provide access on the same basis to
representatives of the state militia and the armed forces of the United States. The Court concluded that a
plain reading of section 2-a of the Education Law allows the application of a uniform anti-discrimination
policy by the institution of the University of the State of New York. Although the Court acknowledged
the Respondent's argument that the legislative comments regarding section 2-a were indicative of an
intention to give preferential treatment to military recruiters, the Court found other legislative material
indicating an intention to give evenhanded treatment of all employers more persuasive. The Court
concluded that the Commissioner was in error when she determined that section 2-a of the Education
Law would be violated if military recruiters were not permitted access to school facilities.
The Respondent also argued that federal law required exception to be made for discriminatory
military recruiters. The Commissioner's finding was based on the fact that the military policy of exclusion
was lawful under federal law and that an Executive order could not prohibit "lawful" discrimination. The
Court was not persuaded by this argument and concluded that the focus of the Commissioner should have
been upon the University's compliance with the Executive Order. The Court went on to hold that the
mere fact the military's practice of discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation is permissible under
federal law does not preclude the executive branch from limiting recruitment speech. The Court went on
to state that every court called upon to consider the issue has held that law schools are under no duty to
cooperate with military recruiters.
The University, added as a party in an interim order, argued that the application of the Executive
Order to military recruiters would jeopardize certain military grants unless the military were to certify to
an exemption. The Court was again not persuaded by this argument holding that a claim of prejudice was
irrelevant to a determination of whether the law school is required to comply with the Executive Order.
The court stated further that other law schools within New York State bar or limit military recruiters and
that the law school at Buffalo would not be placed in any worse position than the majority of law schools
within New York State.
In the final portion of the opinion, the Court addressed the issue of mootness, finding that the
enforcement of the Executive Order continued to be a legally viable issue regardless of the new policy
that requires military recruiters to eliminate certain questions about sexual orientation.
